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Abstract 
 
Recent definitions of energy security have evolved to include qualitative dimensions, 
such as social acceptability, alongside more classic issues such as the availability and 
affordability of energy supplies. Despite the importance of lay-public opinion in shaping 
energy and environmental policy, however, currently relatively little is known about the 
underlying nature of people’s attitudes towards energy security. The current study used an 
online survey to gather perceptions of energy security in samples from two neighbouring 
countries with a historical reliance on energy imports (i.e. Greece & Turkey). There was a 
specific focus on understanding the relationships between individuals’ pro-environmental 
and pro-cultural orientations and their energy security concerns. The results not only confirm 
the multifaceted nature of energy security attitudes but also indicate that the extent and 
nature of this concern (both in general and in terms of a number of sub-facets of concern) 
differs between populations. While pro-cultural orientations were not predictive of concern in 
either subsample, pro-environmental orientations were (e.g. for concerns about fossil fuel 
depletion within the Greek subsample). This research contributes to the literature pertaining 
to the nature and antecedents of lay-public opinions of energy security and provides a 
footing for further systematic investigation into this area. 
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Highlights 
 
- Public opinion can affect policy decisions relating to energy security issues 
- This study investigates energy security attitudes in Turkish and Greek participants 
- The findings confirm the multifaceted nature of energy security concern 
- The extent and nature of energy security concern differs between the subsamples  
- Pro-environmental orientation (NEP) is a good predictor of concern in some contexts  
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 “Given the complex, political nature of energy security, emerging energy security 
challenges, and differing socio-economic attitudes, it is important to understand the social 
and environmental factors that shape perceptions towards energy security” [1], p.620) 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1  What is energy security? 
Energy security is a complex phenomenon. While in essence it can be construed as 
ensuring the “uninterrupted availability of energy at an affordable price” [2], the banality of 
this statement masks hidden depths. For example, not only are there differences in the 
short- and long-term challenges of fostering energy security (e.g. responding to fluctuations 
in supply and demand vs. ensuring timely investment in energy infrastructure projects); but it 
is also shaped by manifold factors (e.g. geopolitics, markets, etc.) and the relative success 
or failure of attempts to ensure energy security can have significant socio-economic and 
environmental ramifications. For an introduction to the concept of energy security, see [3,4].      
The multifaceted and polysemic nature of energy security means that the concept 
has many possible meanings and takes on “…different specificities depending on the 
country (or continent), timeframe or energy source to which it is applied” [5], p. 893). While 
definitions of energy security have historically focused on the availability, reliability and 
affordability of energy [6,7] there is a growing recognition that the concept is more nebulous. 
In line with this understanding, more recent definitions have become more inclusive; 
recognising not only the quantifiable, market-centric roots of early definitions—principally 
governed by considerations of energy (particularly oil) supply and price—but also more 
qualitative considerations such as governance and social acceptability [1,5]. 
The incorporation of social acceptability into the definition of energy security, in 
particular, is important bearing in mind the reciprocal influences that myriad socio-political, 
market and community stakeholders (including publics) can exert on energy and 
environmental policy and decision-making [8–10]. Publics—through their interactions with 
one another and with the socio-political establishment (e.g. politicians and policy makers)—
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are a key group of stakeholders that can shape how energy security is defined within a 
particular context, and any affiliated energy and/or environmental policy response that 
follows [see 1]. Indeed, Corner and colleagues [11] note that public opinion “is likely to be 
one of the most important factors that will determine future technological pathways that […] 
countries take in the face of climate change and energy security” (p. 4825). With this in mind, 
it stands to reason that developing an understanding of publics’ definitions of and attitudes 
towards energy security should be a focus of research. 
1.2 Public attitudes to energy security 
In recognition of the importance that public opinion has in shaping energy and environmental 
policy and decision-making [8–10]; there is now a developing literature on public attitudes 
towards energy security [1,11–16]. A primary focus of much of this research has been to 
assess the implications that concerns about energy security have for energy choices (e.g., 
the impact that framing the energy debate in terms of energy security has on the relative 
preference for different electricity generating options). For instance, several studies have 
found that framing nuclear power in terms of energy security (and climate change) can, if 
sometimes reluctantly, increase endorsement of the technology [11,17,18].  
Another key focus of research in this arena has been to shed more light on regional 
and cross-cultural variations in energy security attitudes, which has yielded some interesting 
findings [1,14,16,19]. For example, Knox-Hayes et al. [1] in an investigation of public opinion 
in 10 diverse countries (including Brazil, Germany, USA, China & Papua New Guinea), 
discovered notable differences in (a) relative energy security concern; and (b) the regional 
and social-demographics attributes giving rise to the concern. Three broad findings were 
registered: (1) the results were seen to confirm the multidimensional nature of energy 
security and its relationships to both quantitative (e.g. availability) and qualitative (e.g. 
governance) considerations; (2) relative oil-import dependence was found to strongly shape 
energy security attitudes and policies, with higher import dependence associated with less 
concern for all aspects of energy security (except availability); and (3) certain socio-
demographic characteristics (particularly older age, female gender & lower education) were 
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found to relate to greater energy security concern. Knox-Hayes et al. [1] concluded that their 
findings illustrated how attitudes towards energy security are embedded within the specific 
socio-economic and cultural systems of a given country [see also 20,21]. 
The literature on lay-public perceptions of energy security is still emerging; however, 
the extant research indicates not only that research into public attitudes towards energy 
security is timely—given the influence that public opinion can exert on policies relating to 
energy security—but also that perceptions of energy security are apparently linked to a 
number of socio-demographic (e.g. gender, age) and psychosocial factors (e.g. socio-
cultural systems). With this in mind, the present study sought to investigate: (1) lay-public 
perceptions of energy security in samples from two neighbouring countries with a historical 
and growing reliance on energy imports (i.e. Greece & Turkey); and (2) the specific 
relationships that two prominent psychological constructs (i.e. pro-environmental and pro-
cultural orientations) share with energy security concerns in each of these two countries.  
1.3 Pro-environmental orientation and energy security concern 
Growing imbalances in energy supply and demand in some countries and the destabilization 
of the world climate through human activity present challenges for ensuring energy security 
[e.g. 1,12]. For instance, the rising global demand for, but reducing availability of, fossil fuels 
to power growing economies—set against the recognised negative environmental 
consequences of their use—highlights the close, complex and yet sometimes conflicting 
relationship that can exist between energy and environmental policy. The evident 
relationships between energy and environmental issues suggest that it would be logical to 
anticipate that an individual’s environmental values, identity, beliefs and attitudes (i.e. their 
‘pro-environmental orientation’) could help to shape (or be shaped by) their concerns about 
energy security.  
A rich literature exists linking aspects of a person’s pro-environmental orientation to 
their environmentally-significant behaviours, including their energy-related behaviours (see, 
[e.g. 22–25]. Generally, a logical relationship is observed (although the strength can vary 
and be affected by certain demographic factors) with those evidencing a stronger pro-
Energy Research and Social Science 
6 
 
ecological orientation tending to be more concerned about the environment and tending to 
be more likely to engage in pro-environmental actions (e.g. lower energy use). 
While it could be argued that the links between pro-environmental orientation and 
energy security concerns will be: (a) more complex (due to the multi-faceted and polysemic 
nature of the construct [5]); and (b) likely to be affected by a number of aspects of the 
physical and socio-political context within which people are situated [e.g. 26,27]; it is 
reasonable to hypothesise that a similar positive correlation should exist between pro-
environmental orientation and energy security concerns in some contexts (i.e. stronger pro-
environmental orientations should correlate with higher concerns about energy security).  
We reason that this is perhaps most likely in states that are dependent on imported 
fossil fuels (e.g. oil and gas) and where people conceptualise energy security issues as 
primarily relating to a choice between: (a) a continued (or growing) reliance on fossil fuel 
imports via vulnerable supply-lines from countries who have control over the availability, 
reliability and price of the supplied energyi; or (b) a shift towards an increased reliance on 
domestically-sourced renewable energy. Indeed, there is certainly evidence linking stronger 
pro-environmental orientations to both preferences for renewable energy options and/or a 
greater concern about an overreliance of fossil fuels, which would help to support this 
assertion [e.g. 28–30]ii 
A scale that is seen to encapsulate an individual’s pro-ecological orientation is the 
New Ecological (or Environmental) Paradigm (NEP) [31,32]. While the NEP has been used 
extensively and variously as a measure of “environmental attitudes, beliefs, values, and 
worldview” [31, p.428], it is fundamentally believed to capture people’s general beliefs about 
the relationship that humans share with the environment [33]. In essence, higher scores on 
the scale relate to stronger endorsement of ‘eco-centric’ beliefs (i.e. the belief that humans 
are part of, and constrained by, nature) and stronger rejection of ‘dominant social’ beliefs 
(i.e. the belief that humans are independent from, and dominant over, nature).  
The NEP has been shown to correlate with a number of energy and environmentally-
significant behaviours [e.g. 34–36] and the concept has been integrated into models of 
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environmental behaviour as a key link in the chain between one’s underpinning eco-
centric/ego-centric values and their personal (i.e. moral) norms and behaviours (e.g. Value-
Belief-Norm model, [37]). While some questions do remain over the dimensionality of the 
NEP [19]; to the extent that it is deemed to capture the essence of people’s relationships 
with the environment, the decision was taken to investigate the strength with which 
endorsement of the NEP might predict energy security concerns in the current study. Based 
upon the fact that Turkey and Greece are both fossil fuel import-dependent states (see 
Section 1.5) and the reasoning that people might construe energy security considerations as 
a choice between a continuing reliance on (imported) fossil fuels (i.e. unsustainable status 
quo) and a shift towards a greater reliance on (domestic) renewables (i.e. sustainable future 
outlook), it was predicted that in the current study that a stronger pro-environmental 
orientation should relate to stronger concerns about energy security (Hypothesis 1). 
1.4 Pro-cultural orientation and energy security concern 
There is mounting evidence linking the cultural norms and practices of a given 
society to their energy supply, demand and use [38–41]; and a growing interest in how 
perceptions of energy security might vary with culture [20,21].iii For example, Sovacool 
[41]—in a narrative account of the social and cultural barriers to alternative forms of energy 
supply in the US—concludes that the impediments facing the introduction of renewable and 
energy efficiency technologies in the country are rooted in the American public’s deep-
seated cultural beliefs about their entitlements for abundant, low-cost electricity. This has led 
to a societal preference for the continued production and use of traditional forms of power 
generation over the introduction of novel, clean energy resources. Similarly, Shove and 
Walker [40]—from the sociological perspective of practice theory—note the intimate 
relationship that energy supply and demand share with the social practices of a given 
population; pointing to the fact that energy is accessed in order to facilitate such social 
practices (e.g. cooking, commuting) rather than simply for its own sake. Thus, according to 
social practice theory, understanding energy-society relations rests  upon developing a firm 
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appreciation of how social practices are “enacted, reproduced and transformed” [40, p.48] 
(see also [42,43]).  
In short, the patterns of energy demand, provision and supply in a given society are 
inherently tied to the social practices of that society; and the social practices and 
expectations of that society are partially determined by the culture of that society [44]. With 
this in mind, it is logical to anticipate relationships between culture and energy security 
concerns; particularly, perhaps, where there are perceived threats to one’s cultural energy 
use practices from an over-reliance on energy imports from unpredictable exporters (c.f. the 
recent Russia-Ukraine gas disputes [e.g. 45]). Importantly, however, while you might 
anticipate societal differences in energy security concerns based upon the nature of their 
energy supply and use practices; at an individual level you might also anticipate that such 
concern would also be moderated by the extent to which a person subscribes to the values 
and practices of their pre-dominant culture (i.e. the extent of their pro-culturalism, see [46]. 
For instance, one might expect that in a culture where practices are strongly tied to 
energy consumption—which is increasingly the case in many societies [e.g. 47]—that the 
more that someone were to identify with that culture, the more concerned they would be by 
issues of energy security. This relationship might be expected to be further strengthened in 
contexts where countries are heavily reliant on energy imports; as such dependence may 
serve to threaten intergroup distinctiveness, strengthen in-group (in this case domestic) 
favouritism and inflate anxieties about an over-reliance on ‘outsiders’ (i.e. energy exporting 
countries) (see, e.g., [48]). However, Knox-Hayes et al.’s [1] recent finding that nations that 
were more reliant on energy import were typically less concerned about many aspects of 
energy security (except availability) argues against such a simplistic hypothesis. 
An alternative hypothesis, therefore, is that where threat to one’s cultural values and 
practices exists (e.g. from greater import dependence), that a stronger subscription to that 
culture (i.e. greater pro-culturalism) somehow serves a protective function for a person, 
thereby reducing concerns. There is certainly evidence from terror management theory [49] 
that cultural worldviews can provide people with a buffer against existential and other 
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anxieties “by imbuing life with meaning, structure, and purpose” [50, p.4] and fostering self-
esteem and a sense of control [see also, e.g. 51]. On this basis, it would be logical to argue 
that those who more strongly identify with their culture—largely irrespective of the energy 
use practice of that culture—should have lower energy security concerns; as their 
connectedness to culture should help to buffer against their anxieties about the future 
affordability, availability, accessibility and/or reliability of energy. 
Within the present research we sought to clarify the nature of this relationship by 
investigating how pro-culturalism would relate to energy security concerns in Greece and 
Turkey. While there are ostensibly competing hypotheses relating to these relationships, on 
the basis of the ‘anxiety buffer’ hypothesis’ [50], we predicted that stronger pro-cultural 
identification should correlate with lower energy security concerns (Hypothesis 2).  
1.5 The present research 
The current article reports on the findings of a survey-based study conducted in 2012 
on a convenience sample of adult respondents from Greece and Turkey. The aim was to 
profile general energy security concerns in each country and then, more specifically, to use 
regression analyses to showcase the relationships between pro-environmental and pro-
cultural orientations and a number of facets thought to underpin general concerns about 
energy security within each country (i.e. import dependence, sustainability, affordability, 
reliability, sufficiency and susceptibility to terrorism, see [11]). Importantly, the research did 
not seek to provide a sociological comparison of the specific cross-national differences in the 
socio-cultural relationships that publics share with energy (production and consumption); but 
rather to psychologically examine the extent to which individuals’ tendencies to identify more 
or less strongly with their culture and the pro-environmental worldviews might affect their 
energy security concerns. 
Greece and Turkey provide an interesting context for investigating energy security. 
Their energy profiles—and thus the security challenges—are arguably similar in many ways. 
For example, both countries have falling domestic production of oil and gas, and are thus 
heavily reliant on imports in order to meet demand [52–54]. In Greece, the primary supplier 
Energy Research and Social Science 
10 
 
of both oil and gas is Russia, with additional supplies coming largely from Middle Eastern 
(e.g. Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia) and North African (e.g. Algeria, Libya) states [53]. In Turkey, 
Russia is again the primary supplier of gas (with key contributions also coming from Iran, 
Azerbaijan and Algeria among others); however, while Russia is also a key exporter of oil to 
Turkey, the primary suppliers are Iraq and Iran [54]. While the absolute reliance on natural 
gas and oil as primary energy sources has fluctuated in each country in recent years, import 
dependency for both fuels in both countries is high and has risen markedly. For example, at 
the time of conducting the current study Turkey had an import dependency of 93.3% for oil 
and an estimated 98.6% for natural gas; while Greece had an import dependency of 99.5% 
for oil and 99.9% gas [52]. Moreover, in both countries, this dependency is forecast to 
increase further in coming years; reaching 94% and 99% for oil and gas in Turkey, and 
99.7% and 100% for oil and gas in Greece by 2018 (see Table 1).  
In contrast, both countries are net producers of coal (primarily lignite) and harbour 
considerable domestic reserves (although both countries still import sources of ‘hard coal’, 
e.g. from Russia [53,54]). In both countries, coal (both hard coal and lignite) accounts for 
around 30% of primary energy consumption, principally for use in electricity generation [55]. 
However, while both Turkey and Greece remain heavily reliant on coal; growing international 
pressures to reduce CO2 production from the energy sector has prompted increases in the 
share of renewables (particularly via hydroelectricity, solar power and wind power) within the 
energy mix, as well as policies designed to reduce energy demand and increase energy-use 
efficiency [56].  
Table 1.  
Demand, percentage import dependency and total proportion of energy supply for Oil and 
Natural Gas in Turkey and Greece between 1990-2012, plus forecasts for 2018. 
 1990 2000 2010 2012 2018 
Turkey Gas Demand (mcm/y) 3,468 14,835 38,127 45,254 59,655 
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Import 
Dependency (%) 
93.9 95.7 98.2 98.6 99.0 
 
 
TPES (%) 5 17 30 32 - 
Oil Demand (kb/d) 477.0 662.8 649.8 670.5 745.4 
 
 
Import 
Dependency (%) 
84.8 92.0 92.6 93.3 94.0 
 
 
TPES (%) 44 40 29 27 - 
Greece Gas Demand (mcm/y) 123 2,052 3,850 4,354 4,901 
 
 
Import 
Dependency (%) 
0 98.2 99.8 99.9 100 
 
 
TPES (%) 1 6 12 14 - 
Oil Demand  (kb/d) 314.1 399.2 372.4 317.9 274.6 
 
 
Import 
Dependency (%) 
94.6 98.5 99.4 99.5 99.7 
 
 
TPES (%) 56 55 51 45 - 
Note. Figures taken from Energy Supply Security: Emergency response of IEA countries 
[52]. TPES = Total primary energy supply; mcm/y = million cubic metres per year; kb/d = 
1000 barrels per day. Natural Gas demand, dependency and TPES figures are estimated 
for 2012. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants and recruitment 
Participants were an opportunity sample  of Greek and Turkish nationals recruited via 
social media (i.e. Facebook and Twitter) and via contacts at four universities in Turkey (Koç, 
Yalova, Hacettepe & Boǧaziçi) and two universities in Greece (CITY College, Thessaloniki, 
and University of Athens) in July 2012. Participants were directed to an online version of a 
questionnaire-based survey about energy security, with participation incentivized via an 
optional prize-draw (worth €25/50TL). 
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A total of 287 participants began the survey (n = 168 Turkish; n = 119 Greek). Of 
these, 175 participants (n = 104 Turkish; n = 71 Greek) completed and submitted the survey 
(i.e. 61% completion rate). Around two-thirds of the sample were male (n = 107, 61.1%), 
most were educated to at least degree level (n = 141, 80.6%). Participants ranged from 16 
and 65 years old and on average were in their late 20s (M = 28.64 years; SD = 7.94 years). 
The recruitment method used in this study led to a preponderance of undergraduate and 
postgraduate students within the sample (n = 89, 50.9%); however, there were also a large 
number of non-student participants (n = 80, 45.7%) (n = 6 chose not to answer). Two-thirds 
of the sample (n = 117, 66.9%) completed the survey within their country of origin; although 
a number of the participants completed the survey from a different country (n = 58, 33.1%).  
Fuller details of the participant demographics, including the breakdown for the 
Turkish and Greek subsamples, are available in Appendix A, Table A. 
2.2 The online questionnaire-based survey (QBS) 
The online QBS was created and distributed using SurveyGizmo (www.surveygizmo.co.uk). 
The QBS was initially developed in English and then translated into Turkish and Greek by 
native speakers. The QBS was then back-translated into English and the original and back-
translated QBSs were compared to ensure correspondence between the items. Any 
necessary modifications were then made to the Turkish and Greek surveys before 
distribution.  
The QBS started with a brief introduction, which provided details of: (a) the rationale 
behind the survey (i.e. to assess participants opinions of energy security issues); (b) the 
prize-draw participation incentive (worth €25/50TL); and (c) the ethical protocols for 
anonymization and data management. The introduction was followed by sections (outlined 
below) devoted to assessing participants’: (a) energy security concerns; (b) environmental 
worldview and beliefs about climate change; and (c) cultural attitudes. The survey ended 
with a demographics section and debrief (see Appendix B for full question wording).iv  
2.2.1 QBS sections 
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a. Energy Security Concern: Concern about energy security was measured 
using a scale comprising six items derived from [11].v These items were selected to 
represent broad aspects of energy security, namely: (1) dependence on energy imports; (2) 
long-term sustainability of energy supply (i.e. concern about reliance on fossil fuels); (3) 
affordability of energy supply; (4) vulnerability of energy supply to disruption by terrorists; (5) 
sufficiency of energy supply (i.e. concern about energy rationing); and (6) reliability of energy 
supply (i.e. concern about power cuts). Participants responded on a 4-point scale (1: not at 
all concerned – 4: very concerned, plus ‘don’t know’ [DK] and ‘no opinion’ [NO] options). The 
scale had good internal consistency within the overall sample (Cronbach’s α = .84) and 
within both the Turkish (α = .84) and Greek subsamples (α = .84). 
Participants were also asked to list where they felt that their country might import 
energy from (free response). This provided an indication of the extent to which participants 
believed that their country was dependent upon other countries for energy, as well as which 
countries they were reliant upon. 
b. Climate change beliefs and pro-environmental orientation: Participants 
were asked if they had heard of climate change (Yes, No, DK) and were then asked to select 
which of one of 6 statements best reflected their views about the causes of climate change: 
(1) fully the result of human activity; (2) party the result of human activity and partly the result 
of natural processes; (3) fully the result of natural processes; (4) mainly the result of human 
activity; (5) mainly the result of natural processes; or (6) I don’t believe in climate change 
(plus DK and NO).  
Concern about climate change was measured using three items taken from Chester 
(2010) used to assess: (1) general concern about climate change; (2) concern about the 
personal effects of climate change; and (3) concern about the effects of climate change on 
society. In each case, participants registered their concern on a 4-point scale (1: not at all 
concerned – 4: very concerned, plus DK and NO).  
Pro-environmental orientation was measured by using the revised New Ecological 
Paradigm (NEP) scale [31]. Participants were required to rate the extent to which they 
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agreed or disagreed with each of 15 statements about the relationship between humans and 
the environment (1: strongly disagree – 5: strongly agree). Even-numbered items were 
reverse-coded such that higher scores on all items reflected a stronger pro-ecological 
worldview. The scale had questionable internal consistency within the whole sample (α = 
.69) and in the Turkish subsample (α = .63) but acceptable internal consistency within the 
Greek subsample (α = .77). In each case, the reliability of the scale was not improved 
markedly by the removal of items. As the NEP is an established measure of pro-
environmental worldviews, the decision was taken to retain the whole scale in the analysis. 
4. Pro-cultural orientation: Pro-culturalism was measured using Choi et al.’s 
[46] 19-item cultural worldview (CW) scale. The scale comprises items assessing: (1) 
strength of cultural linkages; (2) recognition of cultural values; (3) concern over cultural loss; 
and (4) desire to preserve traditions and customs. Participants were asked to express their 
agreement or disagreement with each statement on a 5-point scale (1: strongly disagree – 5: 
strongly agree). Even items were reverse-coded such that higher scores on all items 
reflected stronger pro-culturalism. The full scale had good internal consistency for the whole 
sample (α = .84); was good in the Turkish subsample (α = .86) and acceptable in the Greek 
subsample (α = .77).  
c. Demographics: This section assessed participants’ gender; age (year of 
birth), educational level; employment status; annual household income; religion; general 
political stance (i.e. left, centre, right or other); and specific political party preference (free 
response). Additional items were included, which asked participants to state whether or not 
they agreed or disagreed that: (1) their personal financial situation would improve in the next 
12 months; and (2) the financial situation of their country would improve in the next 12 
months. Responses were made on a 5-point scale (1: strongly disagree – 5: strongly agree). 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Turkish vs. Greek sample comparisons 
 
3.1.1 Energy security concerns 
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Between-subjects t-test comparisons were conducted to identify any differences between the 
levels of energy security concern shown between the Turkish and Greek subsamples.  
Overall, Greek participants were significantly more concerned about issues of energy 
security than the Turkish participants, t(173) = 2.78, p = .006. This difference was principally 
due to greater relative concern about the future affordability of energy, t(168) = 1.68, p = 
.003, import dependence, t(164) = 3.08, p = .002, and fossil fuel depletion, t(160) = 2.60,  p = 
.010; however, the mean scores were higher (although not significantly so) on all items 
except concern about terrorism. Within both subsamples, import dependence was of most 
concern, followed by affordability, with terrorism of least concern. For the relevant means 
and standard deviations for these analyses, see Table 2.      
 
Table 2. 
Mean energy security concerns, pro-environmental and pro-cultural orientation and climate 
change and financial concerns within the Turkish and Greek subsamples 
 
Turkey Greece Sig. 
Energy Security Concerns 
   
- Affordability 3.01 (0.90) 3.41 (0.71) .003** 
- Rationing 2.85 (0.96) 3.14 (0.93) .065 
- Import Dependencea 3.11 (0.97) 3.53 (0.78) .002** 
- Terrorism 2.65 (1.06) 2.49 (1.13) .392 
- Fossil Fuel Depletion 2.81 (0.95) 3.20 (0.98) .010** 
- Power Cuts 2.82 (0.96) 3.07 (0.93) .090 
Overall Mean 2.87 (0.68) 3.15 (0.61) .006** 
Cultural Worldview (CW) scale 
   
Overall Meana 4.01 (0.58) 3.72 (0.45) < .001*** 
New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale 
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Overall Mean 3.52 (0.42) 3.75 (0.47) .001*** 
Concern with Climate Change 
   
- General concern 3.39 (0.78) 3.42 (0.80) .756 
- Personal impact concern 3.21 (0.79) 3.29 (0.89) .530 
- Societal impact concern 3.28 (0.86) 3.33 (0.79) .733 
Personal and national financial situation  
- Personal (next 12 months) 3.05 (1.11) 2.54 (1.08) .003** 
- National (next 12 months)a 2.77 (1.18) 1.80 (0.90) <.001*** 
Note: Means exclude DK and those with no opinion. a Equal variances not assumed. 
Significance = *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
3.1.2 Pro-cultural orientation 
Overall, the full sample averaged a mean score of 3.89 (SD = 0.55) on the CW scale, which 
is significantly above the hypothetical midpoint of the scale (3.00) and means that on 
average the participants had a strong pro-cultural orientation, t (174) = 21.51, p < .001. Of 
the subsamples, however, the Turkish participants were significantly more pro-cultural than 
then Greek subsample on the CW scale, t(170) = 3.61, p < .001. For the means and 
standard deviations associated with this analysis, see Table 2.  
3.1.3 Pro-environmental orientation and climate change concern 
Overall, the full sample averaged a mean score of 3.61 (SD = 0.45) on the revised NEP 
scale, which is significantly above the hypothetical midpoint of the scale (3.00) and means 
that on average the participants were relatively pro-environmental, t (174) = 17.93, p < .001. 
Of the two subsamples, Greek participants on average had a significantly stronger pro-
environmental orientation than the Turkish participants, t(173) = 3.31, p < .001.  
Participants in both subsamples were concerned with climate change and its 
potential for personal and national-societal impacts. General concern, t(173) = 0.31, p < 
.756, as well as specific concern regarding personal, t(168) = 0.63, p < .530, and societal 
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impacts, t(170) = 0.34, p < .733, were statistically comparable between the subsamples. A 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there was a significant difference in participants 
ratings of concern with climate change when considered at a personal, societal or general 
level, F(2, 165) = 6.63, p = .002. This trend was comparable in both the Turkish and Greek 
subsamples, F(2, 165) = 0.33, p = 719. Planned simple contrasts (using personal concern as 
the referent) revealed a non-significant difference between personal and societal concern, 
F(1, 166) = 2.56, p = .112, but a significant difference between personal and general 
concern, F(1, 166) = 13.30, p < .001. Consistent with a self-serving optimistic bias [e.g. 40], 
participants in both subsamples had significantly lower personal concern about the impacts 
of climate change relative to general concern.  
3.1.4 Personal and national financial situation 
In terms of the anticipated financial situation, the Turkish participants tended to agree that 
their personal financial situation would improve in the next 12 months; however, Greek 
participants were more uncertain. In terms of the national financial situation the Turkish 
participants were uncertain, with the Greek participants relatively confident that things would 
not improve. The difference between the Turkish and Greek subsamples was significant for 
both personal, t(173) = 3.04, p = .003, and national, t(171) = 6.14, p < .001, outlooks. Again, 
consistent with a self-serving optimistic bias [57], in both subsamples it was generally the 
case that people saw the national financial outlook to be more negative than their personal 
situation. For all the means and standard deviations associated with the above analyses, 
see Table 2. 
3.2 Predicting energy security concerns 
The initial comparative analysis revealed that participants in both countries harboured 
relatively strong concerns about energy security; however, the Greek subsample was 
generally more concerned than the Turkish subsample, particularly in terms of energy 
affordability, import dependence and fossil fuel depletion. The analyses also established that 
there were differences between the subsamples in terms of the apparent strength of their 
overall pro-environmental (higher in the Greek subsample) and pro-cultural (higher in the 
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Turkish subsample) orientations, and their beliefs about possible improvements to their 
personal and national financial situations (both lower in the Greek subsample). In order to 
see whether these factors would hold explanatory value for (a) predicting general energy 
security concern and (b) predicting each of the specific sub-facets of energy security where 
differences were identified between the subsamples (i.e. import dependence, affordability, 
and fossil fuel depletion), four multiple regression analyses were conducted.  
 a. General energy security concern: Responses to the NEP scale, the cultural 
worldview scale (CW) and the question relating to personal 12-month financial outlook (PFO) 
were used to predict mean energy security concern within each subsample. For the Turkish 
subsample, the overall model was significant, F(3, 100) = 5.84, p < .001, adj. R2= .124; 
although, only the NEP score was retained as a significant predictor (ß = .36, t = 3.87, p < 
.001).  Within the Greek subsample, the overall model was not significant, F(3, 67) = 2.16, p 
= .101, adj. R2= .047; but the NEP score did share a significant relationship with mean 
energy security concern (ß = .27, t = 2.02, p = .039). 
b1. Import dependence concern: When the same predictors (i.e. NEP, CW and 
PFO) were used to predict specific concerns about import dependence, the model was 
significant for the Turkish subsample, F(3, 94) = 3.24, p = .026, adj. R2= .065, with the NEP 
score retained as the only significant predictor (ß = .30, t = 3.05, p = .003). For the Greek 
subsample, the overall model was not significant, F(3, 66) = 0.14, p = .939, adj. R2= -.039. 
b2. Affordability concern: When the predictors were regressed on specific 
affordability concerns; the overall model was again significant for the Turkish subsample, 
F(3, 97) = 5.17, p = .002, adj. R2= .111, with NEP score retained as the only significant 
predictor (ß = .34, t = 3.59, p = .001). The overall model for the Greek subsample was not 
significant, F(3, 65) = 1.13, p = .34, adj. R2= .006. 
b3. Fossil fuel depletion concern: When the predictors were used to predict 
specific concerns about fossil fuel depletion, the overall model was not significant for the 
Turkish subsample, F(3, 89) = 2.15, p = .100, adj. R2= .036; although NEP score did share a 
significant positive relationship with concern (ß = .25, t = 2.44, p = .017). The model was, 
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however, significant for the Greek subsample, F(3, 65) = 13.64, p < .001, adj. R2= .358; with 
NEP score retained as the sole significant predictor in the model (ß = .64, t = 6.07, p < .001).   
3.3. Beliefs about the origin of import dependence 
It was hypothesised that the greater concern with energy security in the Greek subsample 
(particularly regarding concerns over import dependence) might stem, in part, from 
uncertainty over where energy was being imported from.  As such, the answers to the free 
response question asking people to list the countries from which they believed their country 
imported were counted (see Table 3).  
Of the 104 Turkish respondents, 65 (62.5%) listed at least one country. The sum total 
of countries listed by the full Turkish subsample was 148 (Median = 1.0, Range = 0–8 
countries). The countries most commonly listed were Russia (N = 49); Iran (N = 36) and 
Azerbaijan (N = 24). A large number of other countries were listed, with Iraq, Bulgaria and 
Algeria being prominent examples. These figures indicated that a majority of participants 
within the Turkish subsample had some self-claimed knowledge of where energy imports 
were coming from.   
Of the 71 Greek respondents, just 35 (49.3%) listed at least one country. The sum 
total of countries listed by the full Greek subsample was 48 (Median = 0.0, Range = 0–3). 
The countries most commonly listed were Russia (N = 19), Iran (N = 5) and the USA (N = 3); 
however, a large number of additional countries (e.g. Italy, Iraq, Turkey) were also 
mentioned. Also, in contrast to the Turkish subsample, there was a slightly greater reference 
to generic regions (e.g. Middle East, Arab counties) rather than specified countries (N = 5 vs. 
N = 1, respectively). These figures suggested that within the Greek sample, there was 
comparatively lower self-claimed knowledge of where energy imports were coming from.  
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed that the median number of countries named by 
Turkish participants was significantly greater than the median number named by the Greek 
participants, U = 2796.50, Z = 2.88, p = .004.  
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Table 3.  
Countries listed by respondents when asked to provide details of where their nation’s 
energy is imported from 
Turkey Greece (n = 35) 
Country Freq. Country Freq. 
Russia 49 Russia 19 
Iran 36 Iran 5 
Azerbaijan 24 USA 3 
Iraq 12 Other2 21 
Bulgaria 5   
Algeria 4   
Other1 18   
Total number of countries listed 148  48 
1
 Other: Syria, Saudi Arabia, Norway, Libya, Turkmenistan, Nigeria (N = 2); USA, France, 
Ukraine, Qatar, Kazakhstan, Arab countries* (N = 1) 
2 Other: Italy, Iraq, Turkey, Bulgaria, Arab countries*, Middle East* (N = 2); France, Romania, 
Israel, Algeria, Albania, UAE, Greece, Balkan countries*, Europe* (N = 1) 
*Note: For summative purposes, generic regions (e.g. Middle East) were given a count of 1.   
 
4. Discussion 
 
The recognized impact that lay-public perceptions of energy security can have on 
policies regarding matters of energy and environment [8–10], is leading to an increase in 
research into their nature [e.g. 1,11–13]. The present study used an online survey to 
investigate lay public perceptions of energy security in samples from two neighbouring 
countries with a historical and growing reliance on energy imports (i.e. Greece & Turkey). 
Not only did this study aim to shed light on the relative importance given to a number of 
facets of concern thought to underpin more general attitudes towards energy security [11]; 
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but it also sought to flag-up how individuals’ pro-environmental and pro-cultural orientations 
might interact with these concerns. 
The initial descriptive analyses were insightful for a number of reasons. Not only did 
they: (a) confirm the anticipated multi-faceted nature of energy security concerns within the 
sample, exemplified by the different levels of concern expressed towards the different sub-
facets of energy security investigated (e.g. concerns about terrorist disruptions to energy 
supply were low compared to concerns about affordability or import dependence); and (b) 
present some interesting evidence of self-serving biases in participants’ responses (e.g. 
regarding concerns about the personal vs. societal impacts of climate change); but they also 
(c) provided a quasi-experimental opportunity to compare how these concerns varied in the 
Greek and Turkish subsamples.  
It is important to note, however, that while the quasi-experimental design of the study 
did provide an opportunity to directly compare the two subsamples, that results of any such 
comparison should be treated with caution due to the convenience nature of the sample and 
the fact that the Greek and Turkish participants were not experimentally matched (e.g. on 
key demographic variables).  
Participants in both countries harboured relatively strong concerns with energy 
security. This was most notably on the grounds import dependence and the affordability of 
energy. The threat of terrorist disruption to energy supplies was of least concern in both 
subsamples; however, there were some between-group differences in the ordering of the 
other items assessed (i.e. rationing, availability and fossil fuel depletion concerns). Overall, 
Greek participants were more concerned than the Turkish participants. This difference was 
most evident in terms of their concerns about import dependence, the future affordability of 
energy and fossil fuel depletion.  
Importantly, the descriptive analyses also highlighted key differences between the 
subsamples in terms of the strength of their overall pro-environmental (higher in the Greek 
subsample) and pro-cultural (higher in the Turkish subsample) orientations, and their beliefs 
about possible improvements in the personal and national economic situations (both lower in 
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the Greek subsample). The follow-up inferential statistics revealed that pro-environmental 
orientation, in particular, did have an explanatory impact on energy security concerns; 
although this influence was different depending upon the subsample and/or specific energy 
security concern under investigation. Although these findings should be treated with caution 
bearing in mind the limitations of this study (outlined below), it is clear that in a general 
sense—and akin to Knox-Hayes et al.’s [1] conclusions—there should be no “one-size fits 
all” mentality when it comes to understanding and addressing energy security, as the nature 
of concerns about energy security does appear to vary between populations. 
The following discussion seeks to offer explanations for the relative importance of 
import dependence and affordability concerns, as well as using the results of the inferential 
analysis to help delineate the differences between the subsamples on these two concerns, 
plus concerns about fossil fuel depletion. The discussion ends by considering the relative 
importance of the pro-cultural and pro-environmental orientations in explaining energy 
security concerns before limitations and future directions are outlined.    
4.1 Import dependence concerns 
The prominence of concerns over import dependence in both subsamples is logical 
bearing in mind how dependent both countries are on imports of oil and gas (see Table 1). It 
was also clear, within the Turkish subsample at least, that these concerns were positively 
predicted by individuals’ pro-environmental orientations. This finding could be seen to relate 
to the fact that the imported fuels within both Turkey and Greece are primarily high-carbon 
fossil fuels and so therefore environmentally damaging. However, if this were the case, then 
one might question why the link between NEP scale scores and concerns about import 
dependence was not also evident within the Greek subsample. A possible explanation for 
this finding is discussed further below (see fossil fuel depletion concerns). 
The differences in concerns about import dependence between the subsamples 
could be a product of the fact that Greek participants saw themselves to be perceptively 
more import-dependent than Turkey. This is on the grounds that significant proportions of oil 
and gas are transported to Greece via Turkey and thus there is an additional ‘import step’ for 
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Greeks to be concerned about. However, there was little evidence of the energy 
interconnection with Turkey being a source of explicit concern within the Greek subsample. 
Instead, we argue that differences in concerns about import dependence might hinge upon 
differences in the participants’ subjective certainty as to where energy supplies are imported 
from. That is, there appears to be some evidence that the Greek subsample were less clear 
as to where their energy imports come from in comparison to the Turkish subsample, which 
could be a source of their elevated anxiety (see Table 3).  
The implication of this finding is that it is perhaps not an appreciation of being import 
dependent alone that is the root of greatest anxiety, but rather a recognition of import 
dependence paired with a lack of certainty as to where the energy comes from that 
generates most concern. Although tentative and requiring further investigation (e.g. within 
larger and more representative samples and using a more objective measure of awareness), 
this conclusion is, to some extent, consistent with the findings of those of Knox-Hayes et al. 
[1] who found that people living in countries with greater oil inter-dependence showed less 
overall concern for many energy security issues than those living in more energy 
independent nations. One avenue for future research could be to investigate how awareness 
of where energy comes from interacts with energy security concerns depending upon the 
historical, political or regional relationships shared between interconnected trading nations 
and/or aspects of the domestic energy supply and generation context [e.g. 1,58]. One might 
anticipate, for example, that a recognised reliance on unreliable exporters could be a source 
of greater concern than an absence of such awareness in certain contexts (e.g. in the case 
of the Ukraine-Russia gas disputes [see 45]).   
4.2 Affordability concerns 
The prominence of affordability concerns within each subsample could be argued to 
be a product of either the demographic of the participants, the timing of the research and/or 
more complex reasons pertaining to the participants’ rationales for consuming energy. 
Specifically, the relatively young nature of our sample is likely to mean that, on average, our 
participants had less disposable income than would be expected from a sample comprising 
Energy Research and Social Science 
24 
 
more full or part time employed individuals. If true, this could have inflated the relative 
importance of affordability concerns within our sample. Concerns over affordability can 
perhaps also be tracked to the turbulent economic situation in the region at the time of the 
research—both countries were recovering in the wake of the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis in 2012—and differences in how the countries have dealt with this issue [e.g. 59]. 
Indeed, the relatively higher concern placed on the issue of affordability within the Greek 
subsample could be seen to reflect the additional active discussions about Greece’s possible 
withdrawal from the Eurozone (so-called ‘Grexit’) at the time of the study [see 60]. 
Importantly, though, personal financial outlook was not a direct predictor of 
affordability concern in either subsample, which argues against drawing simple conclusions 
about the prominence of this concern based solely upon worries about the absolute cost of 
future energy. Rather, it is possible that concerns about the affordability of energy emerged 
due to the anticipated impacts that any price hikes would have upon the relative cost of 
energy as an expense within their lives. That is, although participants thought they would still 
be able to afford to pay for energy in the future at inflated prices, they were concerned that 
the additional expense would negatively affect their abilities to engage in desirable social 
practices by absorbing more of the disposable income. This conclusion is clearly tentative at 
the current time and is one that we feel warrants further investigation in future research. 
4.3 Fossil fuel depletion concerns  
While not a primary concern to the Turkish subsample, concerns about fossil fuel 
depletion were prominent within the Greek subsample. This difference is mostly likely 
attributable to the apparently stronger pro-environmental orientation shown by the Greek 
subsample relative to the Turkish subsample; a conclusion supported by the results of the 
regression analyses, which indicated that 36% of the variance in this item was accounted for 
by responses to NEP scale scores in the Greek subsample. However, while the regression 
model for the Turkish participants was not significant for this item, pro-environmental 
orientation was still found to positively relate to fossil fuel depletion concerns. 
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On one level, these findings would appear to point to the importance of individuals’ 
pro-environmental orientations as a predictor of their energy security concerns and, logically, 
to those facets of energy security more obviously related to concerns about an over-reliance 
on high-carbon, finite energy sources. However, while not contesting the relevance of 
environmental worldviews as a predictor of energy security concerns, we argue that care 
should be taken when drawing conclusions from our study about the strength of this 
relationship in different populations.  
More specifically, it is possible that the retention of NEP scores within the Turkish 
subsample as a predictor of import dependence, affordability and fossil fuel depletion 
concerns, compared with the solitary emergence of NEP scores in predicting concerns about 
fossil fuel depletion within the Greek subsample, is reflective of differences in what the NEP 
scale is measuring in subsample. While often treated as unidimensional, the NEP scale has 
been found to have multi-factorial structure that differs between cultures [32,61,62]. For 
example, research has indicated that the simple, dualistic relationship between endorsement 
of the NEP and rejection of the Dominant Social Paradigm (or Human Exceptionalism 
Paradigm) tends to be strongest in Western cultures. In non-Western cultures, the picture 
can be more complicated, with people simultaneously endorsing the NEP while still 
endorsing beliefs of human human-exceptionalism [e.g. 61,63]. 
The singular emergence of NEP scores as a predictor of concern with fossil fuel 
depletion in the Greek subsample could suggest that within this subsample the NEP scale 
was tapping relatively narrow desires to limit environmental degradation from human activity. 
This is consistent with the idea that the Greek subsample was responding to the scale items 
in relatively dualistic, Westernised way. This contrasts with the Turkish subsample, where 
the retention of the NEP in all analyses could perhaps be taken to indicate that the scale was 
registering more general concerns about sustainability, including social and economic 
sustainability. Indeed, with respect to the Turkish subsample, the retention of NEP scores in 
the import dependence analysis could be indicative that participants were concerned with 
the potentially finite nature of the imports rather than the fact they are high-carbon in nature. 
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Similarly, the concerns with affordability could stem from the belief that as fossil fuels deplete 
they will become more expensive.  
If true, this explanation not only accounts for the differences in the relationships 
shared between NEP scores and energy security concerns in each of our subsamples, but 
also questions whether or not the difference seen in mean levels of pro-environmentalism in 
each subsample were actually real. That is, while it appeared that the Greek participants 
were significantly ‘greener’ than the Turkish participants, this could have been a product of 
the measure used to assess pro-environmentalism in this study as opposed to any genuine 
underlying differences in their environmental concern. Partial support for this conclusion 
comes from the fact that there were no significant differences in beliefs about anthropogenic 
climate change between the samples, which shows which shows the subsamples to be 
equivalently ‘green’ on some metrics. Thus, while the findings do identify pro-environmental 
orientation to be an important predictor of concerns about fossil fuel depletion they also raise 
questions over the use of the revised NEP scale when drawing cross-cultural comparisons 
about these relationships. We would advise that researchers should seek to use alternative 
measures of individuals’ pro-environmental orientations in future work in order to test the 
findings reported in this article.  
4.3 Limitations and future directions 
There are a number of limitations to the current study. Most notably, we used a 
relatively small, opportunity sample of participants recruited primarily through contacts of the 
research team. As such, the subsamples are not fully representative of the Turkish and 
Greek populations from which they are derived (e.g. there is a preponderance of well-
educated males within each subsample, see Table A, Appendix A). This clearly does affect 
the generalisability of the findings from this research, particularly as some research suggests 
that the ideal target sample size for research into general perceptions should be around 500 
participants [20,64]. Due to budgetary constraints, however, the intention behind this study 
was not to compare and contrast the opinions of large and nationally representative samples 
of Greece and Turkey, but rather to provide an initial take on how relationships between 
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ecological and cultural orientations (assessed by validated measures of pro-environmental 
and pro-cultural orientations) might interact with a number of dimensions thought to underpin 
general concerns about energy security within two energy-import dependent countries. While 
we feel that we have succeeded in our aims, we do also appreciate that there could now be 
value in conducting the research on more representative samples (e.g. using quota sampling 
methods) in order to test the replicability and generalisability of the findings. 
 In terms of understanding the impact of pro-culturalism on concerns with energy 
security, we used a scale that assessed participants’ tendencies to endorse to their cultural 
history and values that was agnostic of cultural differences. While providing a formal analysis 
of how the diverse and rich cultural differences between our Turkish and Greek populations 
(particularly regarding energy-use practices) might have impacted energy security concern 
was beyond the scope of this study, we do feel that such research is now warranted. For 
example, Soyez [65], in a cross-national study involving participants from Canada, US, 
Australia, Germany and Russia, revealed how national cultural values exerted an impact 
upon more specific pro-environmental values in these countries. As such, it is logical to 
hypothesise that there might be parallel differences in how national cultural values impact 
upon concerns about energy security. In fact, it is possible that within our study that some of 
the differences we observed between our subsamples were a reflection of these underlying 
national cultural differences. For example, it is possible that differences in the prominent 
religions in each country (Greek people tending to be Greek Orthodox and Turkish people 
tending to be predominantly Muslim) exerted an influence, bearing in mind the evidenced 
links that exist between faith has on environmentally-significant attitudes and behaviours 
[e.g. 66–68]. 
 A final point relates to the choice of dependent measure used within this study, i.e. 
Corner et al.’s [11] six item measure of energy security. While this scale had a good internal 
reliability in both subsamples as a six item measure of energy security concern, we also 
utilised some of the individual items as dependent measures within our analyses to assess 
more specific concerns about things like the future affordability of energy, import 
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dependence, etc. There are clear limitations to drawing strong conclusions from single item 
measures of complex issues such as the ‘affordability’ and ‘import dependence’. As such, we 
argue that future research should seek to develop and employ multi-item measures of these 
(and other, e.g. energy governance) sub-facets of energy security concern in order to more 
reliably assess the provisional relationships identified in this study.   
5. Conclusion 
The results of the current study confirm a number of key things about the nature of 
public opinion towards energy security issues. At one level, the findings confirm the 
multifaceted nature of energy security attitudes and illustrate that energy security is of 
genuine public concern. Perhaps more interestingly, though, the results indicate that the 
extent of this concern (both in general terms and in terms of the individual sub-facets 
assessed within this study) differs within different populations (in the current case in two 
populations from different energy import-dependent countries). 
 A key aim of this study was to investigate how individuals’ pro-cultural and pro-
environmental orientations might influence their energy security concerns. While pro-
culturalism should not be entirely ruled out as a potential shaper of energy security 
concerns, there was no evidence that a stronger pro-cultural orientation was related to 
general (or more specific) concerns about energy security in this study. Indeed, while there 
were lower levels of energy security concern and stronger levels of pro-culturalism among 
the members of the Turkish subsample (consistent with Hypothesis 2), there is no 
statistically significant evidence of a link between these two factors. 
 In terms of the links between individuals’ pro-environmental orientations and energy 
security concerns, the findings of this research are perhaps more insightful. The 
abovementioned issues regarding the revised NEP scale notwithstanding; it is evident from 
the current study that environmental worldviews are a positive predictor of energy security 
concerns (Hypothesis 1). This finding is consistent with the links that energy security shares 
with the destabilization of world climate through energy supply and use practices [1,13]. 
However, it would appear as though the nature of the relationship is complex; being 
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sensitive to aspects of the social context, contingent upon the facet of energy security being 
considered, and arguably related to the choice of measure used to assess pro-
environmental orientation.  
 While the conclusions of this study are tentative given the stated limitations; the 
research does provide an important contribution to the developing literature pertaining to the 
nature and antecedents of lay public opinions of energy security and provides a footing for 
further systematic social scientific investigation into this area. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A. 
Key demographic details of the full study sample (N = 175) and for separate Turkish (n = 
104) and Greek (n = 71) subsamples. 
 
Turkey Greece Total 
Gender 
   
- Male 67 40 107 
- Female 36 31 67 
N missing 1 0 1 
Survey completion locationa 
   
- Home nation 61 56 117 
- International location 43 15 58 
Age (Years)b 
   
- Mean (St. Dev.) 
- Range 
29.58 (7.37) 
16 - 55 
27.69 (8.42) 
19 - 65 
28.64 (7.94) 
16 - 65 
N missing 39 6 45 
Education Level  
   
- Non university 15 18 33 
- Undergraduate 33 16 49 
- Postgraduate 56 36 92 
- Prefer not to say 0 1 1 
Employment 
   
- Employed 46 26 72 
- Student 48 41 89 
- Other (incl. retired) 6 2 8 
- Prefer not to say 4 1 5 
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Political Affiliation 
   
- Left 45 12 57 
- Centre 16 16 32 
- Right 8 8 16 
- Other 9 9 18 
- Prefer not to say 26 26 52 
Belief in Climate Change  
   
- Yes 
- No  
- Don’t know 
99 
4 
1 
71 
0 
0 
170 
4 
1 
Cause of Climate Change 
   
- Fully/Mainly Anthropogenic 
causes 
42 34 76 
- Equally Natural and 
Anthropogenic causes 
49 28 77 
- Fully/Mainly Natural causes 8 8 16 
- Other (incl. don’t believe) 4 1 5 
N missing  1 0 1 
a
 Greek and Turkish respondents completing the survey from Cyprus were counted as 
completing the survey from their home nation.  
b
 Mean age is an approximate calculation. In the survey, participants were asked to provide 
the year of their birth. The response provided was subtracted from the year within which the 
survey was completed (i.e. 2012) 
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Appendix B 
The following question wording was used in the online survey. The survey questions were 
translated into Turkish and Greek by native speakers of each language.     
1. Energy security  
a. How concerned, if at all, are you that in the future that: (1) Electricity will become 
unaffordable; (2) Electricity will be rationed; (3) Your country will become too dependent on 
energy from other countries; (4) Terrorist attacks will cause interruptions to electricity 
supplies; (5) Supplies of fossil fuels (e.g. coal and gas) will run out; and (6) There will be 
power cuts? [Not at all concerned; Not very concerned; Fairly concerned; Very concerned; 
Don’t know; No opinion]. 
b. Where do you think that [Turkey/Greece] currently imports energy from (please 
state)? [Free response]. 
2.  Climate Change beliefs and pro-environmental orientation (labelled as 
‘Environmental Opinions’) 
a. Before today, had you heard of climate change? [Yes, No, Don’t know] 
b. To what extent do you believe that climate change is the result of human activity of 
natural processes? [Fully the result of human activity; Mainly the result of human activity; 
Partly the result of human activity and partly the result of natural processes; Mainly the result 
of natural processes; Fully the result of natural processes; I don’t believe in climate change; 
Don’t know; No opinion]. 
c. (1) How concerned, if at all, are you about climate change? (2) Considering any 
potential effects of climate change on you personally; how concerned, if at all, are you about 
climate change? (3) Considering any potential effects of climate change on society in 
general; how concerned, if at all, are you about climate change? [Not at all concerned; Not 
very concerned; Fairly concerned; Very concerned; Don’t know; No opinion].    
d. 15-item revised New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale [31]: (1) We are 
approaching the limit of the number of people that the earth can support; (2) Humans have 
the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs*; (3) When humans interfere 
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with nature it often produces disastrous consequences; (4) Human ingenuity will ensure that 
we do not make the earth unliveable*; (5) Humans are severely abusing the environment; (6) 
The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them*; (7) Plants 
and animals have as much right as humans to exist; (8) The balance of nature is strong 
enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations*; (9) Despite our special 
abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature; (10) The so called “ecological crisis” 
facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated*; (11) The earth is like a spaceship with 
very limited room and resources; (12) Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature*; 
(13) The balance of nature is delicate and easily upset; (14) Humans will eventually learn 
enough about how nature works to be able to control it*; and (15) If things continue on their 
present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe. [Strongly agree; 
mildly agree; unsure; mildly disagree; strongly disagree - *reverse coded for analysis so that 
endorsement of all items equates to stronger pro-environmental orientation]. 
4. Pro-cultural orientation (labelled as ‘Cultural Beliefs & Values’) 
 a. 19-item Cultural Worldview (CW) Scale [46]: (1) The cultural values of our 
forefathers are important to me; (2) Culture does not help me to identify myself*; (3) I want to 
know the foods our grandmothers made; (4) We are not losing our cultural heritage*; (5) We 
need to conserve more cultural heritage for future generations; (6) Cultural heritage does not 
mean anything to my wellbeing*; (7) I would like to know our traditional style of dress; (8) 
Students do not need to learn what their culture is*; (9) The present cultural heritage should 
be available for my children’s children; (10) Cultural heritage is not disappearing*; (11) The 
foods our grandmothers made are important to be; (12) We do not need to care about 
cultural heritage*; (13) Cultural heritage must be a part of our life; (14) Although we do our 
business as usual, there won’t be any major cultural loss*; (15) Our traditional style of dress 
is important to me; (16) Buildings, museums and paintings do not have the right to be 
preserved*; (17) Future generations have the right to enjoy the present cultural heritage; (18) 
Ideas, beliefs and customs do not have the right to be preserved*; and (19) Culture helps us 
to live with people of different backgrounds. [Strongly agree; Mildly agree; Unsure; Mildly 
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disagree; Strongly disagree - *reverse coded during analysis so that endorsement of all 
items equates to stronger pro-cultural orientation]. 
5. Nationalism 
a. 17-item Nationalism Scale [69]. Scale not included in the analysis due to errors 
in data collection. Example items include: (1) It is nonsense that all nations are equal. 
Some peoples are more, some less honourable; (2) To be without a nation is like to be 
without a family; (3) It is not good to be too open towards other nations. [Agree very strongly; 
Agree strongly; Agree; Disagree; Disagree strongly; Disagree very strongly]. 
b. What nationality would you say you are (please state)? [Free response] 
6. Demographics (labelled as ‘A Bit About You’) 
a. Gender: What is your gender? [Male; Female; Other; Prefer not to say]. 
b. Age: In what year were you born? [Free response]. 
c. Education level: What is the highest degree or level of school you have 
completed? [No schooling; Primary school; High school; Bachelors degree; Postgraduate 
degree; Prefer not to say]. 
d. Employment status: Are you currently…? [Employed; Unemployed; A homemaker; 
A student; Retired; Unable to work; Prefer not to say]. 
e. Evaluation of personal and country economic situation: (1) In the next 12 months 
your economic situation will improve; (2) In the next 12 months your country’s economic 
situation will improve; (3) The distribution of income in your country is fair? [Strongly agree; 
Mildly agree; Unsure; Mildly disagree; Strongly disagree]. 
f. Religion: What is your religion? [Islam; Christianity; Judaism; No religion; Prefer not 
to say; Other (please state)]. 
g. Political opinion: (1) What are your political views? [Left; Right; Centre; Prefer not 
to say; Other (please state)]; (2) Please state which political party you support. [Free 
response]. 
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ii
 The nature of the relationship between pro-environmental orientation and energy security concern is 
something that requires further investigation. For example, one might assume that in situations where 
the status quo is reversed (i.e. where there is a perceived overreliance on domestic, renewable 
options); that those with weaker pro-environmental orientations might show higher concerns for 
energy security (e.g. due to concerns about intermittency [70]).  
iii
 For an outline (and delineation) of the ‘cultures’ that are of relevance within the context of research 
into energy security, see Sovacool [20]. 
iv
 A further section aiming to assess participants’ nationalism—using Todosijević’s [69] 17-item 
nationalism scale—was included in the survey but errors in the data collection for this scale meant 
that it could not be used in the analysis. 
v
 In a slight difference to Corner et al. [11] we phrased all questions such that they related to ‘energy’ 
rather than the original mix of ‘energy’ and ‘electricity’ themed questions. 
